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Criminology and the Collective  
Consciousness of Society  
  
Kenneth Smith  
 
  
This essay describes six major criticisms of Émile Durkheim’s concept of the common or collective consciousness 
of society and three major revisions of Durkheimian sociology generally based on these six major criticisms. These 
six criticism and three major revisions are as follows:  
(1) that the disciplinary functions of society—the peculiar combination of a love of duty, authority and regulation 
as Durkheim describes this—does not form any part of Durkheim’s concept of the common or collective 
consciousness of society as such, but is in fact analytically separate from this.  
(2) that a definitive translation of the French expression phrase ‘la conscience collective ou commune’ can be 
made into English without any loss of meaning as ‘the common or collective consciousness’.  
(3) that we can and should make a clear distinction—and this is also my first major revision of what Durkheim 
himself says—between the concepts of the common consciousness and the collective consciousnesses 
(plural) of society. These are really two quite separate concepts I think, albeit closely related and clearly of 
the same type or kind.  
(4) that Durkheim’s account of crime and punishment in The Division of Labour  was intended by him to apply 
only to societies characterized by what he calls ‘mechanical solidarity’ alone while his account of crime and 
punishment in The Rules of Sociological Method is better understood as being intended by Durkheim to apply 
to cases of organic solidarity alone. Durkheim does not actually say this himself, but I argue that it is implied 
in what he says and this is therefore my second major revision of Durkheimian sociology.   
(5) that because Durkheim failed to distinguish between crime and punishment in his early sociology he is unable 
to argue in The Rules of Sociological Method that it is punishment alone that is morphological for highly 
industrialised societies, and not crime at all. Crime is always ‘pathological’ for society I argue, and this is 
especially so in the context of mechanical solidarity where the very idea that there is any such thing as crime 
is a threat to the existence of the common consciousness.  
(6) In The Division of Labour in Society Durkheim believed that the common consciousness of society certainly, 
and hence for him the collective consciousness too was shared by more or less everyone in society 
universally, with the sole exception of criminals. However this is not in fact the case in modern society. In 
modern society I argue that there is a fairly wide variation in the collective consciousness of society from one 
part of a country to the next and from one generation to the next. Durkheim did not get this wrong exactly I 
think, but rather the situation he was describing and the situation today has changed. This then is my third 
major revision of Durkheim sociology  
  
Durkheim’s concept of the (or a) collective consciousness of society has been extensively discussed before by any 
number of sociologists and criminologists (Lukes, 1973; Hirst, 1979; Alexander 1990; Garland, 1991; Cotterrell, 1999, 
Pearce, 2001) but, as far as I can discover, no book-length treatment of this very important concept in Durkheimian 
sociology has been attempted until the publication of my Émile Durkheim and the Collective Consciousness of Society, 
a Study in Criminology in 2014 (Anthem Press). My book considered Durkheim’s concept from both a criminological and 
a sociological perspective, while this essay highlights the six major criticisms I make of what Durkheim has to say on 
this subject and, based on this, the three major revisions that I recommend we make to Durkheimian sociology to bring 
this up to date in the 21st century.   
A major problem that immediately confronts the author of any book on Durkheim’s concept of the common or 
collective consciousness of society is that, although Durkheim uses this expression repeatedly, the account that he gives 
of this concept in The Division of Labour in Society [hereafter The Division of Labour] and also, to a lesser extent, in his 
second major work, The Rules of Sociological Method [1895, hereafter The Rules], is really very poor indeed, so much 
so that it sometimes difficult to say exactly what Durkheim himself understood by this term. Durkheim, if I can put it this 
way, seems rather to know exactly what he meant by this concept than he is able to explain this to us, his readers. 
However, the re-publication by the Dover Press in 2002 of the English translation of Durkheim’s little known work 
L’éducation morale [1925]—a series of lectures gathered together by his students after Durkheim’s death in 1917 and 
first published in English in 1961 with the title Moral Education—provided an opportunity to look at this question again 
in much more detail than Durkheim did in his other better known works.   
 
 
Although mainly concerned with the question of the reform of the education system in France at the beginning of 
the 20th century, the first half of the book provides us with a very detailed account indeed of what Durkheim meant by 
the concept of the collective consciousness itself: the most detailed account of this concept in fact to be found anywhere 
in his sociology. In Part I of my book, I therefore summarise Durkheim’s writing on the concept of the (or a) collective 
consciousness of society based on his lectures on this subject in Moral Education and I then compare this to what he 
has to say here to his other major writings on this subject, but especially in The Division of Labour and in his final book 
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life [1912].  
In what I claim is the first major finding of my book I argue that the disciplinary functions of society—the peculiar 
combination of a love of duty, authority and regulation as Durkheim describes this—does not form any part of Durkheim’s 
actual concept of the common or collective consciousness of society as such, but is in fact analytically separate from 
this. Rather surprisingly, although ‘the disciplinary principle’, as Durkheim calls this in Moral Education, is the foundation 
of his concept of the common and collective consciousness of society, this principle does not itself form any actual part 
of his concept of the common or collective consciousness of society as such (Smith, 2014: 28-29). At most, for Durkheim, 
the disciplinary function is only part of the general morality of society—the basis of this and therefore its foundation and 
background perhaps—but nothing more than this.  
If my interpretation of what Durkheim says on this point is correct then this has serious implications for Durkheimian 
criminology since, strictly speaking, it means that we cannot appeal to the disciplinary apparatus of society—the fear of 
punishment for example—as any part of Durkheim’s account of the common or collective consciousness. We might well 
try to do this, and in fact I argue that Durkheim himself does, but we are not correct to do so if what I say is correct. 
Stripped of the disciplinary function, Durkheim cannot appeal to the rule of law, or even to the love of duty, to account 
for what it was that he was trying to explain in The Division of Labour. Durkheim’s failure to realise the significance of 
this is then perhaps the major reason why he is unable to explain the failure of the common or collective consciousness 
to perform the role that he assigned to it in modern industrialised societies. It is not Durkheim, but his contemporary Max 
Weber (and after Weber, Michel Foucault) who is the sociologist of power, domination, and discipline in society (Weber 
1978, 1149-1155; Garland 1991, 177-181) while, as is well known, the discussion of these all important issues is almost 
entirely absent from Durkheim’s sociology.   
 If Marx can be said to be the sociologist of the material basis of society1, and Weber the sociologist of power and 
domination, then Durkheim is the sociologist of morality and consensus (Smith, 2010). For Durkheim morality is the 
cement that binds everything else together and, as we will see, where this moral force is weak or otherwise poorly 
developed, the collective consciousness is in danger of assuming an immoral or aberrant form. The separation of the 
disciplinary function of society from that of the common and collective consciousness is then perhaps the reason why 
the collective consciousness failed to develop properly—that is, as Durkheim expected it would—in modern 
industrialised societies. It is perhaps I think because of an actual division between the disciplinary function of society 
and the collective consciousness, rather than to a flaw in Durkheim’s analysis of this as such, that the collective 
consciousness in modern industrialised societies does not develop as part of the normal functioning of the division of 
labour (or ‘organically’ as Durkheim describes this process), but has to be artificially created in some way. Durkheim 
probably would not have agreed with me on this point, but I argue that this is the inescapable conclusion of what he has 
to say about the concept of the common and collective consciousness of society in the first half of his book on Moral 
Education.  
Still in Part I of my book, and based on Durkheim’s discussion of the concept of the collective consciousness of 
society in Moral Education, I then try to give a detailed explanation of why I believe the French phrase ‘la conscience 
collective ou commune’ can be translated into English without any loss of meaning as ‘the common or collective 
consciousness’, and, in this way, I hope to put an end to the common but extremely irritating practice in English speaking 
sociology—and especially within criminology I find—of always giving this phrase in the French original (usually in italics 
and / or in quotation marks, as the ‘conscience collective’, and without the order of these words being reversed in the 
usual way when translating French expressions of this kind into English), almost as though it is being suggested that 
this expression cannot be translated into English without serious loss of meaning. But, providing only we once have a 
really thorough understanding of what Durkheim meant by this concept, and I claim that we do now have just such an 
understanding since this is provided by Durkheim in the first half of Moral Education, then we can, once and for all, say 
exactly what Durkheim meant by this expression and, this being the case, translate this understanding of the concept 
into English without any ambiguity or loss of meaning as ‘the common or collective consciousness of society’.    
                                                 
1 As a matter of fact Marx was rather disparaging about the concept of the ‘the social’ and therefore probably would not have liked 
the idea of being described as any kind of ‘sociologist’. See for example Marx’s letter to Kugelmann dated 5th December 1868 
discussing a publication called ‘Society and State’, of which Marx says “ ‘the social’ (and that’s a fine category too!) is treated as 
the secondary and ‘the political’ as the essential.” (MECW, 1988, (43) 175; emphasis in original).  
 
 
In Part I, I also argue—in what I claim is the first major revision of Durkheimian sociology proposed by my book—
that we can and should make a clear distinction between the concepts of the common and the collective 
consciousnesses (plural) of society. These are really two quite separate concepts I think, albeit closely related and 
clearly of the same type or kind. Durkheim hints at this distinction himself but, as a matter of fact, it is not at all clear 
what his final view on this question was. Sometimes he appears to think that these two concepts should be clearly 
distinguished while and other times, and in fact more usually, he seems to believe that this is not the case. The clearest 
indication that Durkheim gives that he thought we might be able to distinguish the common from the collective 
consciousness is in the first few pages of chapter three, Book II, of The Division of Labour (1989, 226-230).  
Here, the common consciousness seems to have more to do with traditional beliefs and practices and is closely 
associated with that type of social solidarity that is due to similarity, which Durkheim calls ‘mechanical solidarity’. For 
example he says that religion is the outstanding form of the common consciousness [or ‘la conscience commune’ as he 
says in this case] (1989, 227), while the collective consciousness [‘la conscience collective’] seems to be identified more 
with the increasing development of the division of labour in society, which Durkheim calls ‘organic solidarity’, or in other 
words such solidarity that exists despite considerable differences in society.2 At most other times however—as for 
example in his most famous definition of the common and collective consciousness in Part I, chapter 2 of The Division 
of Labour (1989, 38-39)—these two terms seem to be presented as being more or less interchangeable:  alternative 
names for much the same social phenomenon. I think it is most likely that Durkheim changed his mind on this question, 
as and when the situation he was describing changed, and that he sometimes thought they were one and the same 
thing, in one social situation, but different things altogether in another situation. But, whatever Durkheim’s own views on 
this question were, I think we can say for him that these two concepts are really quite distinct, or, at the very least, that 
they are analytically separable from one another and that, generally speaking, they are better understood in this way. I 
believe that this is a missed theoretical opportunity on Durkheim’s part and, as a matter of fact, it puzzles me that he did 
not make this distinction more clearly for himself. The ‘common consciousness’, in my view, is the more elementary of 
the two types and is most closely associated with mechanical solidarity. We typically find this expressed in the form of 
things like institutionalised religion—Durkheim’s exemplar case of the common consciousness—but class 
consciousness too, where this was sufficiently well developed (Smith 2012, 188), would also provide another very good 
example of this type of phenomenon. The collective consciousness, on the other hand, is the more complex and 
sophisticated of the two types, but is also much less well structured, much less likely to assume an institutionalised form, 
and is therefore more likely to be found in societies characterised by organic solidarity.    
Having outlined in Part I of this my book exactly what Durkheim meant by the concept of the or a collective or 
common consciousness of society I then attempt, in Part II of this study, to provide a detailed empirical description of 
what a Durkheimian concept of the common or collective consciousness might actually look like in practice, if any such 
thing can in fact be said to exist. It is a really very surprising fact—and one that seems largely to have been neglected 
by Durkheimian scholarship (for partial exceptions to this rule see Hirst 1975, 90-103; Pearce 2001, 17-18 and Newburn 
2007, 174)—that Durkheim did not do this himself after he had written The Rules. Instead of providing us with a detailed 
empirical account of the common or collective consciousness of French society in the 1890s, Durkheim chose to write 
his third book on the subject of suicide, a topic that might well have leant itself very well to an analysis in terms of the 
concept of the common or collective consciousness, but in which, remarkably, Durkheim actually makes only two explicit 
reference to this concept (interesting enough, one to the collective consciousness and the other to the common 
consciousness; 1993, 359 and 369). In Part II of my book, and thereby making a start on the project that Durkheim 
neglected, I argue that unless sociology can say exactly what the concept of the collective or common consciousness 
looks like in actual practice—detailed case studies of the actual nature and form of this phenomenon in different 
societies—then we will be forced to conclude that no such thing actually exists and that Durkheim, for all his confidence 
in the matter, was simply mistaken on this point. If this turned out to be the case then Durkheim’s thesis—and much of 
the rest of his sociology along with this I think—would have been refuted. However, in fact, in a detailed analysis of 
contemporary British society, I do find evidence of something that I think might reasonably be called the collective 
consciousness of contemporary British society today, albeit no real evidence for anything corresponding to the common 
consciousness as such. Therefore, at least as far as modern Britain is concerned—and this is just one case study of 
course—I find that Durkheim’s thesis is not refuted. What other studies might reveal is of course another matter.  
Rather surprisingly, it turns out that the collective consciousness of modern British society is not concerned with 
large-scale, or macro-sociological, features of society at all. Things like religion or nationalism, or even a veneration for 
                                                 
2 See also the following reference in chapter III, Book I of The Division of Labour (1989, 69), where Durkheim says that: ‘rules 
where sanctions are restitutory either constitute no part of the collective conscience, or subsist in it only in a weakened state. 
Repressive laws corresponds to what is the heart and centre of the common consciousness.’ [In the original French this is given as 
follows: ‘r’egules ‘a sanction restitutive ou bien ne font pas de tout partie de la conscience collective, ou n’en sont que des ‘etats 
faibles. Le droits r’epressif correspond ‘a ce qui est le coeur, le centre de la conscience commune’ (2004 [1930], 80-81)  
 
 
‘the rule of law’,3 are not—or perhaps I should say, are no longer—part of the  collective consciousness of modern British 
society. They used to be I think, at the beginning of the 20th century, when, in 1902 for example, Britain introduced 
something called ‘Empire Day’ on the 24th May, the date of the recently deceased Queen Victoria’s birthday (Skidelsky 
2010, 627), and school children were made to march up and down in the playground and salute the flag of the United 
Kingdom. At this time, I believe, many people would have been genuinely outraged if anyone had refused to take part 
in such a ceremony, but this is no longer the case today, at the beginning of the 21st century. A good example of how 
much things have changed in this respect is the recent case of Charlie Gilmore, the son of the Pink Floyd guitarist David 
Gilmore, who was sentenced to 16 months imprisonment in 2011 for swinging on a flag at the Cenotaph—the UK’s 
foremost war-memorial—during a public demonstration held in London in 2010 (Smith, 2014: 6). The public’s reaction 
to this event seems to have been quite mixed, but might perhaps be divided into three broad groups. First there was 
perhaps a fairly large group of people—but not the majority I think—who were genuinely outraged by Gilmore’s 
behaviour. This would not just have been older people, I argue, but anyone who takes part in poppy-day celebrations 
and stands still at the eleventh hour, on the eleventh day, of the eleventh month each year to commemorate the ending 
of the First World War. These are people for whom flag waving ceremonies and memorials of all kinds really do mean 
something: people who have lost relatives and friends in the Second World War and more recently in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, a second group of people—a slight majority of the population perhaps—seem to have been 
largely indifferent to the event. For them Gilmore behaviour was perhaps nothing more than just another picture in their 
Sunday newspaper—another student behaving badly at yet another student demonstration—and this affected them no 
more perhaps, no longer, than it took them to turn over the page. Finally there seems to have been a third group of 
people, much smaller in number this time I think, and largely made up of young people and students themselves, who 
might have quite admired what Gilmore did, and might even have done the same thing themselves had they been on 
the demonstration, all the while wondering however where they could buy those rather distinctive shoes that Gilmore 
can been seen wearing in Ki Price’s famous photograph of the event. The point I am making however is this: that 
whatever the actual details of the matter were, it is quite clear that not everyone in Britain was equally outraged by 
Gilmore’s behaviour and that some people were not outraged by this at all. A reverence for flags, and even war 
memorials it seems, is not part of the collective consciousness of modern British society, and certainly is not part of 
anything that might reasonably be called its common consciousness.  
Rather it is those apparently quite petty, but actually very irritating, events of everyday social life—things like adults 
cycling on the pavement, people throwing litter in the street (‘Why can’t they take it home with them?), or, in my case, 
academics writing the expression ‘conscience collective’ in italics— that deeply offend us. Orderly behaviour in public 
places, I argue, is in some way intimately involved with the collective consciousness of modern British society. Aspects 
of the common consciousness are still to be found in British today, but it is these things do not have very much to do 
with religion or nationalism any more. Rather this has something more to do with customary practices and behaviour 
and then, following on from this, with what is presented as being a veneration for tradition. It does not matter at all 
whether these customary practices or traditions in question are in fact of long standing. All that matters is that those 
people who are closely incorporated into the common consciousness of society sincerely believe that they are: that 
things have ‘always been done’ in more or less the same way as they are now and always will be. And if one points out 
that, as a matter of fact, things have not always been done in a certain way—that mass imprisonment for example is a 
relatively recent development, or that ceremonials at the coronation of a new monarch are largely an invention of the 
TV age—this makes not a jot of difference to people who support the use of imprisonment on an industrial scale or are 
ardent monarchists.  
In Part III of my book I then provide a detailed account of Durkheim’s views on the subject of crime and punishment 
in general in order to examine in detail how his views on the concept of the common or collective consciousness of 
society are related to this question in particular. I claim that there is what I think amounts to two schools of thought on 
this question within contemporary criminology. In one camp there are those criminologists who, when they discuss 
Durkheim’s views on crime and punishment, seem to rely very heavily on what he has to say about this in The Division 
of Labour, and who therefore spend quite a lot of time talking about the collective consciousness and mechanical and 
organic solidarity. While, in the other camp, there are those criminologists who generally rely on what he has to say in 
The Rules, who therefore talk a lot about the question of whether or not crime is functionally useful for society—
‘morphological’ or ‘pathological’ as Durkheim describes this—and who usually have very little to say about the common 
or collective consciousness. As far as the first school is concerned, it appears to be a little known fact that Durkheim 
entirely abandoned all discussion of the important distinction he makes between mechanical and organic solidarity in 
                                                 
3 I pay particular attention to this concept in Part II—a case study within the case study in fact—which at one point I thought might 
provide a really promising candidate for the role of the common consciousness in contemporary British society, and hence help to 
explain the present media obsession with crime and punishment, but which I was reluctantly forced to conclude does not in fact 
perform this role  
 
 
The Division of Labour never to refer to this concept again in his sociology after this point (Bellah 1973, xl). While, 
similarly, as far as the second school is concerned, Durkheim’s equally interesting discussion of whether crime might 
be morphological or pathological for society is not repeated by him again after The Rules except for a very short 
restatement of this thesis at the beginning of the final chapter of Suicide [1897]. There seems to be very little common 
ground between these two very different schools of thought within contemporary criminology and neither of them have 
anything very much to say about the really interesting question here: the conspicuous absence of any thing very much 
on the subject of crime and punishment in Durkheim’s sociology after Suicide except for his undeservedly well-known 
‘Two Laws of Penal  
Evolution’ essay [1902].        
Because Durkheim’s views on crime and punishment in The Division of Labour are really so very different from his 
views on this subject in The Rules, there is every chance that we might even say that they contradict one another. Were 
they not by the same author, I argue, we would never even think to compare them. However, in what I claim is the 
second major revision of Durkheimian sociology in my book, I argue that, in fact, there is no contradiction between these 
two very different views. In what appears to be another little noticed fact, Durkheim’s discussion of crime and punishment 
in The Division of Labour, and all of the really controversial things he has to say about these two concepts in that book, 
occur in a chapter entitled ‘Mechanical Solidarity, or Solidarity by Similarities’ and therefore, I argue, would perhaps be 
better understood as being intended by Durkheim to apply to cases of mechanical solidarity alone. While, if this is the 
case, the very different claim that Durkheim makes in The Rules that crime is somehow functionally useful for society 
might then be better understood as being applied to cases of organic solidarity only. To make myself clear on this point, 
I am not arguing that Durkheim says this—I am not even really sure that he did intend his discussion of crime and 
punishment in The Division of Labour to only be applied to cases of mechanical solidarity—but what I am saying is that 
it makes very much better sense of what Durkheim does say about crime and punishment in these two very different 
accounts, and avoids any contradiction between these two quite different Durkheimian accounts of this question, if we 
do in fact say something very much like what I am advocating  here.  
In Part III of my book I also make another equally sharp distinction between the concepts of crime and punishment; 
something that Durkheim himself was surprisingly reluctant to do in his early writings on this subject. I argue that it is 
because Durkheim does not clearly distinguish between these two really quite separate concepts for himself in The 
Division of Labour and in The Rules that, contrary to what he argues in The Rules, he is unable to see that it is 
punishment alone that is morphological for highly industrialised societies and not crime at all. Crime is always 
‘pathological’ for society I think, and this is especially so in the context of mechanical solidarity where the very idea that 
there is any such thing as crime is a threat to the existence of the common consciousness. By contrast to this however 
I argue that it is just possible that punishment—but not crime—might have a ‘morphological’ function in societies 
predominantly characterised in terms of organic solidarity since, in these communities, punishment does provides people 
who otherwise have very little in common with each other with a rare opportunity to come together in opposition to the 
criminal and hence to reassert moral norms (Jackson and Sunshine 2007, 214).   
In Part IV of my book I then look in some detail at another fundamental concept of Durkheimian sociology, the 
concept of ‘social facts’, of which the concept of the common or collective consciousness of society is one of his main 
examples. I do this in order to consider what I argue is another astonishingly neglected aspect of Durkheimian 
criminology; namely, what on earth Durkheim could have meant in his much quoted definition of the common or collective 
consciousness in The Division of Labour when he claimed that the collective consciousness is not only that ‘totality of 
beliefs and sentiments common to the average member of society’ but, also, that this totality somehow ‘forms a 
determinate system with a life of its own’ (1989, 3839; emphasis added). Although a great deal of attention has been 
given within criminology to the first part of Durkheim’s most famous definition of the collective consciousness of society, 
the second part of this definition has been entirely ignored. However I argue that, incredible though it must seem to us 
today, Durkheim really did believe, at least in the early part of his career, that ‘social facts’ as he calls them were living 
things—living beings in fact—‘with a life of their own’. It is simply impossible, I believe, to understand Durkheim’s early 
enthusiasm for the concept of social facts and his later disenchantment with this concept—sometime after the publication 
of Suicide I think—unless we recognise that he really did believe that he had discovered an entirely new class of 
sociological phenomena—a social realm underlying the surface appearance of things in our own three-dimensional 
world fact—which was to be the special subject matter of the new science of sociology.  
In Part V of my book I consider again in some detail the many problems we have encountered in attempting to 
establish Durkheim’s concept of the, or as I now argue, a common of collective consciousness of society. Here I consider 
in some detail the question why Durkheim chose the division of labour in society—the division of labour of all things as 
I say: something that he might well have supposed was as likely to divide people from one another as to bring them 
together—as the means of creating the collective consciousness of modern industrialised societies when, it seems, 
there were so many other much better candidates to choose from. The formal answer to this question is that Durkheim 
simply adopted his views on the subject of the division of labour from Herbert Spencer and, to a lesser extent, from Saint 
 
 
Simon—however, in Part V of this study, I claim that there was something more to it than this, and in fact I argue for 
what I describe as an ‘epistemological break’ in his writing between his pre and post 1896 views on this question.   
In The Division of Labour Durkheim is very confident indeed that the collective consciousness of society, left to 
itself, will develop on its own, and that of course something very much like this already existed. No society could possibly 
exist without something like a common or collective consciousness, as Durkheim supposed, and therefore there was 
nothing very much that needed to do be done—nothing really that could be done—to bring about the development of 
this crucial social phenomenon. By 1902, however, and largely I believe as a result of Durkheim’s own experiences 
during the now notorious Dreyfus Affair [1894-1906], his views on the development of the collective consciousness 
changed dramatically. Left to itself, Durkheim came to believe, the collective consciousness of France, as exemplified 
by the Dreyfus Affair, might well assume the aberrant form of authoritarianism, militarism and even anti-Semitism. The 
people of France needed to be taught what was otherwise likely to remain unclear to them; namely, that we are all to a 
much greater degree than appears to be the case dependent upon one another in highly industrialised societies. For 
this reason, France needed to establish a whole new education system—quite literally a whole new school of thought in 
fact— in order to promote this idea which Durkheim had once believed would develop organically by itself, and he gave 
his series of lectures on moral education at the Sorbonne as part of his contribution to this project.  
In Part V I also consider the question why Durkheim was quite so opposed, as he seems to have been, to the idea 
that socialism might fill the role of the collective consciousness of a modern industrial society.  Here was an ideology 
which, after all, had developed alongside and together with industrialisation, or ‘organically’ as we might well say, which 
had important points to make about the morality of the capitalist mode of production, and which most of Durkheim’s own 
students thought was tailor-made to provide the basis of the new morality suitable for an industrialised country in the 
20th century, and yet Durkheim himself did not think this and was in fact opposed to any such suggestion (Smith, 2014: 
174-180). In what seems like an increasingly desperate attempt to find an alternative to socialism, Durkheim goes 
through contortions to find almost anything else—the education system, the science of sociology itself, the promotion of 
the concept of human rights and, most bizarrely of all, the creation of new professional associations—to provide an 
alternative common consciousness for a highly industrialised society in the 20th century. Durkheim was not, as has 
sometimes been suggested, a conservative, but what he was rather was both a liberal and, more particularly I argue, a 
member of the educated town dwelling bourgeoisie. As such he supported the aims of the French Revolution of 1789—
liberty, equality and fraternity—but was only able to go along with these ideals up to a certain point. This point was the 
point at which the socialist programme came into conflict with the interests of the bourgeoisie. He supported those 
reforms which were opposed to the interests of the aristocracy, and authoritarianism more generally, but he was unwilling 
to go any further than this. Something else apart from socialism must therefore be found to perform the all-important 
role of the collective consciousness of French society during the 20th century.   
This brings me finally to the sixth major finding and / or disagreement I have with what Durkheim says about the 
concept of the common and collective consciousness and to what I claim is the third major revision of Durkheimian 
sociology that I am proposing in order to try to overcome these problems. This has to has to do with the very important 
question of whether or not the common or collective consciousness of society is believed in more or less universally by 
everyone, with perhaps only a few minor exceptions as Durkheim claimed, or whether it is in fact much less universal 
than Durkheim believed it to be. Apart from criminals, Durkheim thought that support for the common and collective 
consciousness of society was more or less universal and insisted that this is the case in The Division of Labour. However, 
extending the argument I have already outlined above, I argue that in fact this is only the case as far as mechanical 
solidarity is concerned, and only really applies in the context of the common consciousness too. As far as the collective 
consciousness of modern industrialised societies is concerned however, not everyone is equally incorporated into the 
collective consciousness I think, but this takes a variety of different forms at different times and places. We are not all 
equally outraged by the same things, I think, and not all at the same time or place, but rather what is included in the 
collective consciousness varies regionally and also varies dramatically from one period in time to another and from one 
generation to the next.   
As far as the issue of local variations is concerned, Durkheim considered this possibility himself in some detail in 
The Division of Labour (1989, 230), but seems to have come to the conclusion that this was something that would 
change over time once the collective consciousness of society developed and became more firmly established. As he 
says on this point:  
   
It is true that local collective consciousness can retain their individuality within the general collective consciousness 
and that, since they encompass narrower horizons, they can more easily remain concrete. But we know that they 
gradually vanish into the general consciousness as the different social segments to which they correspond fade 
away (1989, 230).     
   
 
 
But in point of fact this claim is incorrect—we do not ‘know’ any such thing at all—but rather what we do know is 
that the one thing that seems to distinguish the collective consciousness in particular from the common consciousness 
of society is precisely the fact that the collective consciousness is much less well formed—much more loosely organized, 
much less definite, and much less institutionalized—than the common consciousness and, where this is the case, such 
local variations are likely to be a permanent feature of the collective consciousness of highly industrialised societies 
rather than something that will wither away as the collective consciousness develops.  
As far as the possibility that the common or the collective consciousness might vary from one generation to the 
next—and hence vary over time too— Durkheim has this to say in one of his lectures on Moral Education, first given ten 
years after the publication of The Division of Labour.  
  
‘[E]very generation has its own spirit, its own way of thinking and feeling, its own needs, and its special aspirations. 
We have a fact here whose causes are as yet not well known. There are linguistic changes in each generation, 
changes in fashion, in aesthetic appreciation, and in philosophical views. A cosmopolitan generation is succeeded 
by a very nationalistic generation, or vice versa. Optimism follows pessimism. Anarchism follows religious 
dogmatism, and so on. Such moral discontinuity between generations runs the risk of giving social evolution a jerky 
and erratic character, promoting chaotic impulses, if precautions are not taken to bring different generations 
together as soon and as completely as possible, so as to encourage their interpenetration and so closing the moral 
gaps between them (Durkheim 2002, 248-249).  
   
But if this is the case then it must also be the case—contrary to what Durkheim says in The Division of Labour—
that the collective consciousness of society certainly, and perhaps even the common consciousness too, is not always 
or everywhere the same within any given society. The generation that idolized Queen Victoria, that marched up and 
down in British playgrounds on ‘Empire Day’, and that cheerfully went off to fight in the First World War, was not the 
same at all as the generation that reluctantly went to war in 1939-1945.  
Even by the time he came to write Moral Education Durkheim was still arguing that society ‘cannot exist except on 
the condition that all of its members are sufficiently alike—that is to say, only on the condition that they all reflect, in 
differing degree, the characteristics essential for a given ideal, which is the collective ideal’ (Durkheim 2002, 87-88).4 
But I argue that the collective consciousness is not like this. Rather it is something more like a Mexican wave at a football 
stadium or perhaps one of those very large banners that are sometimes handed over the heads of the crowd and move 
their way gradually from one part of the stadium to another. There are a number of different collective consciousnesses 
in society at any one time and in different places, some now rising, some currently predominant, some now falling away, 
and some long since gone. Each one of these different consciousnesses has its own set of values, and hence a different 
set of things that cause some people to become outraged when, as they see it, the values they hold dear are violated, 
and there is no necessary identity or overlap between the views held by people at the back of the wave or those in the 
forefront of new opinions (Smith, 2014: 88-89).   
I concluded my book by arguing that there is indeed such a thing as the common or collective consciousness of 
society—Durkheim was right to identify this concept I think and what he says about this phenomenon has made an 
important contribution to the sociology of knowledge—however, as I have indicated, I do not believe that Durkheim, 
especially in The Division of Labour, always got the nature or the form of this concept right. I therefore wish to conclude 
this essay by arguing that it is necessary to revise what Durkheim had to say on this point. To revisit Durkheim’s work 
merely to give an account of what he has to say—or yet another account as we might say—would be a pointless exercise 
I believe. But this is not the purpose of my book. Apart from the six major criticisms of Durkheim’s concept of the common 
or collective consciousness specifically which I have suggested here and the three major revision of his view on the 
subject of sociology generally which I have argued these six criticisms lend themselves to, what I have tried to do in my 
book is not just to revise Durkheim’s views of this concept but really, as Frank Pearce says (2001, xxi), to re-theorise 
these. The purpose of my book is not only to look once again in some detail at the major arguments of Durkheim’s 
sociology on the question of the common and collective consciousness of society, especially as this has influenced the 
                                                 
4 This is one of those really annoyingly functionalist statements that Durkheim makes, that, each and every one of us without 
exception; including criminals for example?...reflect in differing degree (but how much degree of difference then is permissible 
before we have passed the point where we are all committed to the same) ‘collective ideal’? By definition it must be true that since 
a society—any sort of society—always exists at any given time, then it must also be true that the people in this society are 
‘sufficiently alike’ to get on with one another even if their interests are radically opposed and a revolution is about to break out at 
any time. It would then perhaps be better to say that no society can survive without changing unless its people are sufficiently alike 
and committed to roughly the same common ideal, and that any change which takes place must reflect the degree of difference [or 
belief in and support for] this common ideal. (See further on this point the essay by Jack Knight 2001, 354-373, and also Turner 
2006, 226)  
 
 
development of contemporary criminology, but to argue for a systematic reworking of what he had to say on this question 
while the purpose of this essay has been to give some indication of what direction such a re-theorisation of Durkheim’ 
work might take.   
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